You raise some interesting points. Some I wish I could disagree with although I can’t. Principally that the US should avoid this conflict as much as it can, including fighting off the temptation to arm and train Ukrainians.
But unfortunately you are also making some of the exact points that Prime Minister Chamberlain made after the peace conferences with Hitler before the Poland (oh dear, accidental Hitler reference. I promise it’s the only one) invasion.
My point is that every so often in Europe there is a power that seeks stability and a buffer between itself and “instability”. Now we are calling it Putin but before we have called it Napoleon or Kaiser. Western and Eastern European countries have seen this played out before. The appeasement tactic has been tried before. It doesn’t always work. It doesn’t always fail.
Brings us back to the million Ruble question, what the fuck does Putin want?! My guess, he wants to surpass Peter Grozny as the iconic Russian leader. It’s not about land (that’s just how you keep score), it’s not about economic or military security (that’s just how you identify your opponents) - it’s about winning the respect of Russians that will be born hundreds of years from now. historically you do that by building them an empire.
“The West should negotiate a new status quo with Russia that is acceptable to both sides and does not result in a series of war zones and frozen conflicts remaining along the periphery of Europe.”
You’re joking, right? The notion that Russia wants anything other than frozen conflicts along it’s periphery is not true. I can’t honestly see Lavrov and Putin seriously “hammering-out” those issues. The simmering conflict is the point.
I’ll go one further, despite the Kremlin’s protestations to the contrary the NATO alliance has been the single greatest stabilizing power to Putin’s regime. Do you think Putin goes to bed thinking German tanks are going to roll into his country? No, quite the opposite.
Putin likely woke up repeatedly in the George W. Bush years of Iraq entanglement and the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” with a sense of existential dread - NATO was working so well that the EU itself would assert itself more outside of the framework of an American led security arrangement. He didn’t want that.
It’s no coincidence that the last American tank left Germany the same year as the Kremlin’s Crimean seizure. The Kremlin was most assuredly worried about NATO’s success (decades of stability and the soft landing of the USSR collapse) fostering a more assertive EU. The NATO alliance’s collective action against the murderous Gaddafi regime was the last straw.
I don't think the assumption of blind malice is either true or helpful. Not that there's a way to test this theory, but I'd bet that if Georgia offered to recognize its breakaway regions as independent states in return for a guarantee from Russia of fixed, delineated borders, Russia would take the deal gladly. I suspect the creeping part of the creeping occupation is designed to coerce Georgia towards that outcome.
With regards to Crimea, it had nothing to do with NATO tanks in Germany. There was a Western-backed coup against Ukraine's democratically-elected President, who fled to Russia to save his own life; seizing Crimea was Russia's response. I doubt the coup was Russia's preferred outcome, since they had been obviously very keen on working with Ukraine - enough to offer them billions in financial assistance in 2013 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118). The claim that Russia just wants simmering conflict with Ukraine doesn't explain why this desire suddenly manifested at exactly the same time as pro-EU protesters overthrew the government there.
“With regards to Crimea, it had nothing to do with NATO tanks in Germany. There was a Western-backed coup against Ukraine's democratically-elected President, who fled to Russia to save his own life; seizing Crimea was Russia's response. I doubt the coup was Russia's preferred outcome“
The US pulling tanks out of Germany displayed (depending on one’s point of view) either:
1. A show of disinterest in traditional European security concerns by the United States about the threats posed by the Kremlin.
2. A show of disrespect by the United States towards the threats posed by the Kremlin.
By the time the US pulled tanks out of Germany, the Kremlin had sat back and watched as the Obama administration declared a “pivot to Asia” in 2011, and watched as the Republican Party fielded two candidates (McCain and Romney) who declared that Putin, personally, was a problem.
By 2013, with Clinton no longer Secretary of State, and with the US seemingly interested in Great Power politics in the Pacific Rim, this was, for the Kremlin, a change in the status quo.
The Kremlin tried to poison Kuchma and has no problem in encouraging assassination attempts - you really think they care about “coups” - or do you think they care about images of young people protesting in former Soviet satellites. The Soviet response to protests was always to run over protesters with tanks and to bash skulls in with truncheons.
FWIW: I’ve read repeatedly that the Bush administration was convinced that if the 2008 war in Georgia continued longer than the Kremlin had planned that “seizure of Crimea” was to be just another tool in their toolbox.
You raise some interesting points. Some I wish I could disagree with although I can’t. Principally that the US should avoid this conflict as much as it can, including fighting off the temptation to arm and train Ukrainians.
But unfortunately you are also making some of the exact points that Prime Minister Chamberlain made after the peace conferences with Hitler before the Poland (oh dear, accidental Hitler reference. I promise it’s the only one) invasion.
My point is that every so often in Europe there is a power that seeks stability and a buffer between itself and “instability”. Now we are calling it Putin but before we have called it Napoleon or Kaiser. Western and Eastern European countries have seen this played out before. The appeasement tactic has been tried before. It doesn’t always work. It doesn’t always fail.
Brings us back to the million Ruble question, what the fuck does Putin want?! My guess, he wants to surpass Peter Grozny as the iconic Russian leader. It’s not about land (that’s just how you keep score), it’s not about economic or military security (that’s just how you identify your opponents) - it’s about winning the respect of Russians that will be born hundreds of years from now. historically you do that by building them an empire.
An excellent proposal for a negotiation framework, brought to my attention by a reader: https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/09/a-four-step-off-ramp-for-resolving-the-ukraine-crisis-00006769
“The West should negotiate a new status quo with Russia that is acceptable to both sides and does not result in a series of war zones and frozen conflicts remaining along the periphery of Europe.”
You’re joking, right? The notion that Russia wants anything other than frozen conflicts along it’s periphery is not true. I can’t honestly see Lavrov and Putin seriously “hammering-out” those issues. The simmering conflict is the point.
I’ll go one further, despite the Kremlin’s protestations to the contrary the NATO alliance has been the single greatest stabilizing power to Putin’s regime. Do you think Putin goes to bed thinking German tanks are going to roll into his country? No, quite the opposite.
Putin likely woke up repeatedly in the George W. Bush years of Iraq entanglement and the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” with a sense of existential dread - NATO was working so well that the EU itself would assert itself more outside of the framework of an American led security arrangement. He didn’t want that.
It’s no coincidence that the last American tank left Germany the same year as the Kremlin’s Crimean seizure. The Kremlin was most assuredly worried about NATO’s success (decades of stability and the soft landing of the USSR collapse) fostering a more assertive EU. The NATO alliance’s collective action against the murderous Gaddafi regime was the last straw.
I don't think the assumption of blind malice is either true or helpful. Not that there's a way to test this theory, but I'd bet that if Georgia offered to recognize its breakaway regions as independent states in return for a guarantee from Russia of fixed, delineated borders, Russia would take the deal gladly. I suspect the creeping part of the creeping occupation is designed to coerce Georgia towards that outcome.
With regards to Crimea, it had nothing to do with NATO tanks in Germany. There was a Western-backed coup against Ukraine's democratically-elected President, who fled to Russia to save his own life; seizing Crimea was Russia's response. I doubt the coup was Russia's preferred outcome, since they had been obviously very keen on working with Ukraine - enough to offer them billions in financial assistance in 2013 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118). The claim that Russia just wants simmering conflict with Ukraine doesn't explain why this desire suddenly manifested at exactly the same time as pro-EU protesters overthrew the government there.
“With regards to Crimea, it had nothing to do with NATO tanks in Germany. There was a Western-backed coup against Ukraine's democratically-elected President, who fled to Russia to save his own life; seizing Crimea was Russia's response. I doubt the coup was Russia's preferred outcome“
The US pulling tanks out of Germany displayed (depending on one’s point of view) either:
1. A show of disinterest in traditional European security concerns by the United States about the threats posed by the Kremlin.
2. A show of disrespect by the United States towards the threats posed by the Kremlin.
By the time the US pulled tanks out of Germany, the Kremlin had sat back and watched as the Obama administration declared a “pivot to Asia” in 2011, and watched as the Republican Party fielded two candidates (McCain and Romney) who declared that Putin, personally, was a problem.
By 2013, with Clinton no longer Secretary of State, and with the US seemingly interested in Great Power politics in the Pacific Rim, this was, for the Kremlin, a change in the status quo.
The Kremlin tried to poison Kuchma and has no problem in encouraging assassination attempts - you really think they care about “coups” - or do you think they care about images of young people protesting in former Soviet satellites. The Soviet response to protests was always to run over protesters with tanks and to bash skulls in with truncheons.
FWIW: I’ve read repeatedly that the Bush administration was convinced that if the 2008 war in Georgia continued longer than the Kremlin had planned that “seizure of Crimea” was to be just another tool in their toolbox.