This is an essay about how the Georgian draft law on foreign influence fits into the larger regional and global context of Russia vs. the West. The tl;dr version is: it does!
However, there are some people who have argued that the draft law is not a “Russian” law or that the law is “reasonable” or that the protesters are overreacting, or astroturfed, or paid agents of foreign governments, etc. etc. etc. I wanted to respond to those claims, from the perspective of someone who lives here in Georgia.
Precedent: The Russian Law in Russia
In 2012 Russia passed a law on foreign agents requiring certain people and organizations to declare themselves “foreign agents” and register with the state. This law has been used to aid in the repression of civil society and media in Russia, and especially to target people and organizations who are critical of the government. Since its passage it has been expanded three times and now includes designations for family members of “foreign agents”. Other laws and administrative rules allow Russian authorities to take restrictive and punitive actions against “foreign agents”, and “foreign agents” cannot, for example, work with children or teach at state universities.
It must be made clear that the proposed law in Georgia was modeled on Russia’s law, and not (as proponents claim) on US laws such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Ted Jonas has explained some key differences between the Georgian draft and the US law at civil.ge. So, simply put, one reason to oppose this law in Georgia is that we’ve seen how it has been used - and expanded - over the last twelve years in Russia. We don’t want to see what has happened in Russia happen in Georgia.
In that sense, it is perfectly reasonable to describe this as the “Russian law”. It is modeled on a Russian law, and the concerns opponents have with the law are clearly demonstrated by the impact of the Russian law on Russia.
Appeal to Emotions?
Russia is a sore spot for Georgians, and has been for quite some time. Georgians will point out that they have been victimized by Russian imperialism for a century, that their country is still occupied by Russia, and that after the start of the Ukraine war, Russians came to Georgia and treated it like a Russian colony rather than its own sovereign state.
Therefore, calling something “Russian” in Georgia is an effective rhetorical device and can motivate Georgians to protest. When a Russian MP, Sergey Gavrilov, sat in Georgian Parliament during a religious conference, it set off a protest that ended up lasting for days.
Given the emotional valence, perhaps it is cynical to invoke Russia in order to bring out protesters? According to Jacobin, the protesters don’t even care about the law itself - only the perception that the country is moving towards Russia. Shouldn’t the law be debated on its merits, and not turned into a base appeal to an emotionally charged, but ultimately irrelevant, issue?
Well the problem with that line of reasoning is that the merits of the law are inextricably tied up with Russia. You literally can’t debate the merits of the law without citing the Russian precedent. You can’t criticize opponents of the draft law for doing their due dilligence in conducting a rigorous analysis or for simply restating publicly known facts about its provenance. Furthermore, Georgian Dream knew exactly how politically charged this issue was for the Georgian people because the same exact protests happened last year in response to the same draft law. Blaming the opposition for provoking an emotional reaction doesn’t make sense if that reaction was entirely predictable based on past precedent.
But on a deeper level - aside from the basic similarity of the laws - this issue is also about Russian geopolitical influence, and in particular how authoritarian regimes influence and copy each other - how they learn from and support each other.
A Global Problem
When Georgians say they don’t want the Russian law, it isn’t just that they don’t want the law because it originated in Russia. Georgians also don’t want to go down the Russian path - to authoritarianism and corruption. “Russian” here can serve as a shorthand for a certain kind of subversion of democratic institutions that we see not only in Russia, but also in Belarus, Hungary, Turkey, etc. Sure, there are elections, but the state institutions are configured in such a way as to make meaningful competition impossible. Political parties which pose a threat are banned. Media which criticize the government are censored, bought out, fined, attacked, or simply outlawed. All of this is enacted through legal-rational mechanisms to place a patina of legitimacy over what is fundamentally an anti-democratic process: the destruction of meaningful political dissention. The “Russian law” on foreign agents can therefore only truly be understood in the context of an authoritarian project to remove the will of the people from the process of governing. Russia didn’t invent this project, but Russia is certainly a world leader in pioneering innovative new ways to make it work.
The issue of countries which are nominally or performatively democratic but which stifle or disallow democratic competition poses a major challenge for liberal democracies.
The issue of countries which are nominally or performatively democratic but which stifle or disallow democratic competition poses a major challenge for liberal democracies. The EU in particular has a problem with Hungary, an EU member state which increasingly challenges the EU’s consensus on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In light of this it is not hard to see why the EU might want to pump the breaks on admitting another country which seems to be heading down the path of Russian-style governance. Although EU officials are too diplomatic to say “we don’t want another Hungary”, that’s an important part of the context when they warn Georgia that this law will jeopardize Georgia’s path to the EU.
Consequently we have another reason for opponents of the “Russian law” to call it Russian: if and when this law derails Georgia’s EU accession bid, it will push Georgia further into Russia’s sphere of influence. Joining the EU would strengthen Georgia’s economic ties with European countries; failing to do so will reinforce Georgia’s reliance on its economic ties with Russia. The EU also exerts pressure on Georgia to respect human rights; without the EU’s influence, there will be no counterweight to Georgian reactionaries who emphasize historical and religious ties to Russia as a fellow Orthodox country which respects so-called “traditional” values.
Like it or not, there is a geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, and Georgia will inexorably be pulled towards one side or another. Any law which pushes Georgia closer to a Russian style of government also pushes Georgia politically and economically closer to Russia.
Note that this does not mean that Putin himself sponsored or ordered the draft law. We don’t really know how much influence Putin, or Russia, has over Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream. Could be a lot, could be a little. Putin might be happy about the law, or he might not care. But that’s why the slogan is “no to Russian law” and not “no to Putin’s law”.
This also doesn’t necessarily mean that Georgian Dream’s primary goal was to pull the country towards Russia. It seems to me their primary goal is to solidify their own power both for its own sake and so that they can get away with the type of elite corruption that can make politicians and their supporters very, very rich, at the expense of the citizenry (and one wonders why allegedly socialist Jacobin made no mention of that). However, intentional or not, it has been made clear to the Georgian Dream government that their actions are pulling the country towards Russia, and so, at this point, you cannot say that the move is not deliberate. Whatever their motivations, Georgian Dream is undeniably, knowingly, moving the country away from Europe and towards Russia, and this law is a large component of that move.
What Have Foreign Agents Ever Done For Us?
The Jacobin article I mentioned earlier also has some choice criticism for NGOs and foreign aid organizations which operate in Georgia, and they are not alone. Some folks on social media have been questioning whether foreign influence is good for Georgia or whether foreigners should leave Georgians alone.
Now, I was under the impression that Jacobin was a socialist magazine and that socialists favored the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. A hit piece against foreign aid agencies seems uncharacteristic. Surely Jacobin must have something to substantiate the accusations that foreign aid organizations are harmful.
Well if they did, I couldn’t find it in their article.
I’ve worked in public schools in Georgia that lacked indoor heating and plumbing. When I worked at Kutaisi School No. 36, eleven years ago, if I wanted to use the toilet I’d walk home. There was electricity - sometimes - often brought to the classrooms by exposed wiring. There was a student in one of my classes with a learning disability who received no help and no attention from his teachers. The English texts were outdated and riddled with basic errors.
Then one day a group from a a foreign-funded NGO showed up - a Georgian psychologist and some learning specialists - and did a consultation with the school, including an interview with the student. They provided training and materials for how to assist this student and meet his learning needs. This was the first intervention this student had ever received. I know this is anecdotal - I could google stats on Georgian education reforms - but Jacobin’s complaint was that locals are not involved, and don’t see improvements, and that’s just… a lie.
A few years later, thanks to the Milennium Challenge Corporation, School No. 36 was completely renovated into a modern and beautiful school, with heating and plumbing and no exposed wiring and facilities that students can feel proud of. The same for the school where my daughter currently studies, and for several other regional schools. Every time my daughter or her classmates wash their hands at school they have “foreign agents” to thank.
Also thanks to “foreign agents”, students study English using textbooks developed according to modern methodology and proofread by English language experts. I’ve looked at my kids’ textbooks in other subjects, and for the most part they are excellent.
The law may target “foreign agents”, but make no mistake - its victims will be locals. Europeans and Americans will not suffer for having their donations rejected. Georgian kids will suffer when aid organizations are forced to shut down their local operations.
“Foreign agents” work on every aspect of Georgian education - in the capital and in the regions. They work on rights and accessibility for disabled students. They work on teacher training. They work on curriculum development. They work on establishing Education departments in local universities to train more teachers. They bring in foreign experts and they consult with locals. They talk to teachers and administrators with direct experience in Georgian schools. They talk to students and parents. Is it perfect? Not at all. Is it better than it was in 2010 when I got here? Absolutely.
The law may target “foreign agents”, but make no mistake - its victims will be locals. Europeans and Americans will not suffer for having their donations rejected. Georgian kids will suffer when aid organizations are forced to shut down their local operations.
But you don’t have to take my word for it! Eurasianet has interviewed other “foreign agents” whose operations would be undermined or destroyed by this law, including:
A news outlet uncovering corruption in a largely rural region of Georgia on the border with Azerbaijan.
An independent living center for the disabled situated near the Black Sea coast in the country’s second-largest city, Batumi.
One of Georgia’s oldest human rights defense organizations, providing legal aid for victims of domestic and gender-based violence, refugees, and asylum seekers.
Migration and Development
I would be remiss if I didn’t mention substantive criticisms of Georgia’s EU path. Essentially, if Georgia joins the EU, it will accelerate the process of young, talented Georgians leaving the country and working abroad, which will in turn undermine local development.
I believe the best way to address this concern is to make Georgia as appealing as possible for young people to stay in. That would entail, among other things, ensuring robust human rights protections and a functioning democracy, rather than a corrupt authoritarian democracy-in-name-only state designed according to the Putinist model.
But aside from that, Georgians deserve the right to determine their own future. Georgian youth shouldn’t be required to sacrifice their dreams to contribue to local development. It’s our responsibility as adults to provide our children with opportunities and choices, and if we can’t do it here, we should wish them luck in Europe or wherever they choose to go.
And once again, the alternative to Europe is not a Georgia pristinely free of foreign influence - it’s a Georgia pulled deeper into Russia’s orbit. If Georgians feel the need to migrate abroad to make money and the EU won’t take them, they’ll have to go to Russia. Until 2014, Russia was the source for the majority of remittances to Georgia from foreign countries - that is, more money came to Georgians from people (presumably Georgian expats) in Russia than from every other country in the world put together. That could easily be the case again if Georgian policy strains Georgia’s relationship with the EU.
EU integration is perhaps the most popular mandate in all of Georgian politics, and it’s motivated by both the desire to escape Georgia’s history of Russian interference and the desire to have a future in Europe.
The reality of international politics in the modern world is interdependence. Georgians have to choose which countries will be their trading partners and migration destinations and vacation spots and geopolitical allies in the future. Georgians have overwhelmingly chosen the EU, over and over again. EU integration is perhaps the most popular mandate in all of Georgian politics, and it’s motivated by both the desire to escape Georgia’s history of Russian interference and the desire to have a future in Europe.
Conclusion: No to Russian Law!
The “Russian law” is both symbolically and instrumentally a move away from Europe and towards Russia. We can point to both the “vibes” of the law - very authoritarian, quite Putinesque - and to the concrete problems with it: the practical effects such laws have had in other countries including Russia, the specific, measurable benefits “foreign agents” bring to Georgia which would be threatened by this law, and the geopolitical reasons to believe this law would actually jeopardize Georgia’s chances for EU accession.
Given the enormous potential for harm brought about by this law, Georgians have many good reasons to protest it. If their rhetoric is more focused on the law’s Russian associations than on the law’s concrete bad impacts, well, that’s just politics. Opponents of the law have chosen the most effective tactic to oppose it, and slogans are not chosen for their ability to capture nuance. Rest assured, however, that there are many very sound reasons to oppose this law - the rhetoric is not empty and the slogan does capture serious and pertinent aspects of the problem with this draft law.
I have often said that if Georgians want to join the EU they need to commit to EU values. Countless Georgians are now doing exactly that: fighting for a European-style open and participatory democracy with a robust public sector and a free media, rather than a Russian-style de facto dictatorship rife with corruption and run by oligarchs. Personally, I’m with the Georgian people on this one: I prefer the EU.
No to Russian Law.
Good analysis and common sense take really
good post Neal -- do share it widely.